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UNITED STATES v. PINEDA-MORENO: 
TRACKING DOWN INDIVIDUALS’ 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
“It may be said that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their 
first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and slight 
deviations from legal modes of procedure.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The fantastic technological progress of the twenty-first century has 
provided law enforcement with more efficient methods to fight crime, 
pressing courts across the country to define the limits of what tactics the 
government may employ before it has violated an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.2  Like many Americans, law enforcement agencies 
are eager to purchase the newest and most advanced technologies.3  
 1 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
 2 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to the citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 
(1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (remarking “that the fantastic advances in the field of electronic 
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual;  [and] that indiscriminate 
use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, 
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance 
that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive.”) 
 3 Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/. 
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Among the devices that police agencies have adopted are Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”) transmitters4 to track the movement of 
individuals.5  By recording precise geographic locations, GPS 
technology is an ideal alternative to visual surveillance of an individual’s 
whereabouts.6  However, the constitutional implications of this 
technology on privacy in America are unresolved, since the Supreme 
Court has not yet decided the issue.7  As a result, we are left with the 
question whether police use of such technological advancements has 
propelled us into “the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to 
surveillance at all times.”8  As a court that covers one fifth of the 
country’s population, the Ninth Circuit plays a major role in this 
developing Fourth Amendment issue.9  Recently, it confronted the 
intersection of Fourth Amendment protections and law enforcement’s 
use of GPS tracking devices in United States v. Pineda-Moreno.10 
In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged police 
monitoring of a defendant’s precise location through the use of GPS 
transmitters did not constitute a search.11  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit 
 4 A GPS transmitter “records the date, time, latitude and longitude of the transmitter in 
programmed intervals of two to three minutes each time the GPS device moves. The GPS transmitter 
is approximately the size of a pack of cigarettes, and is powered by batteries, which last 
approximately two to three weeks. The GPS transmitter has a cellular modem component that 
permits remote access to the stored tracking information and current location of the transmitter.” 
Morton v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 05-CV-4000 (SJF)(AKT), 2007 WL 4264569, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007). 
 5 Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 
13, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html. 
 6 Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/; see Ben Hubbard, 
Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 13, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html 
(noting that officers argue that “GPS is essentially the same as having an officer trail someone, just 
cheaper and more accurate”). 
 7 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 661, 674 (2005); see Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The Government Knows Where 
You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 103, 107 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has made no decision regarding GPS 
technology). 
 8 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 9 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Adam Cohen, The Government’s New Right to Track 
Your Every Move With GPS, TIME, Aug. 25, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2013150,00.html. 
 10 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 11 Id. at 1217. 
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relied on the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Knotts.12  Knotts 
held that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”13  Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pineda-
Moreno, most federal appellate courts interpreted Knotts to hold that 
location tracking outside the home is analogous to physical surveillance 
and therefore does not constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.14  Since Pineda-Moreno, however, other courts have 
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and have held that prolonged GPS 
monitoring of a defendant’s movements does constitute a search.15 
Part I of this Note presents the facts and procedural history of 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, followed by a discussion of relevant 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, highlighting the Supreme Court’s 
public-exposure doctrine as described in United States v. Knotts.  Part II 
argues that the Ninth Circuit based its decision in Pineda-Moreno on the 
precise issue the Supreme Court declined to decide in Knotts: whether 
prolonged twenty-four-hour electronic surveillance of an individual 
constitutes a search.  In Part III, this Note goes on to analyze how the 
Ninth Circuit’s misinterpretation of the Knotts holding compelled it to 
prematurely reject Pineda-Moreno’s Fourth Amendment claim without 
analyzing whether he had a justifiable expectation of privacy.  Part IV 
concludes that law enforcement’s use of GPS technology to monitor 
Pineda-Moreno’s movements over the course of four months constituted 
a search because it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.  In 
Part V, this Note proposes a practical two-step analysis that balances the 
Supreme Court’s public-exposure doctrine with the privacy interest at 
stake when the government utilizes advanced technology, like GPS 
tracking, to conduct comprehensive surveillance of an individual. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Ninth Circuit decided two issues in Pineda-Moreno: first, 
whether Pineda-Moreno possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the undercarriage of his vehicle when it was parked in his driveway, on 
the street, or in a public parking lot;16 and second, whether the use of 
 12 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 13 Id. at 282. 
 14 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 15 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010). 
 16 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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GPS devices to monitor the totality of Pineda-Moreno’s movements in 
his vehicle over the course of four months constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.17 
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. 
 PINEDA-MORENO 
While shopping at a Home Depot on May 28, 2007, a Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent noticed a group of men 
purchasing a large quantity of fertilizer.18  The agent recognized the 
fertilizer as a type commonly used to grow marijuana.19  The men left the 
store in a 1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee, later identified as belonging to 
Juan Pineda-Moreno.20 
Over the next month, Pineda-Moreno and his partners purchased 
irrigation equipment and a large quantity of groceries, using his vehicle 
on several of these occasions.21  After the men purchased a large amount 
of groceries for the second time, store security staff alerted the police, 
who followed the men back to Pineda-Moreno’s rental mobile home.22 
Agents began surveillance of Pineda-Moreno’s home.23  On seven 
different occasions, agents installed three types of mobile tracking 
devices onto the undercarriage of Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle without a 
warrant: four times while his Jeep was parked on a public street in front 
of his trailer, twice while it was parked in his driveway, just a few feet 
from his home, and once while it was parked in a public parking lot.24 
Using these mobile tracking devices, agents monitored the location 
of Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle over the course of four months.25  Two of 
the devices used GPS technology that relayed the exact location of the 
vehicle to police.26  The other device was a cell phone that transmitted 
signals to cell-phone towers.27  Agents could remotely access 
 17 Id. at 1216-17. 
 18 Opening Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. 
 19 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Opening Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. 
 23 Id. 
 24 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. 
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information collected by the devices; the devices could also store the 
data, which police would then download to a computer after removing 
the device from Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle.28 
Alerted by one of the mobile tracking devices that Juan Pineda-
Moreno’s Jeep was leaving a suspected marijuana grow site, DEA agents 
followed and pulled over Pineda-Moreno.29 During this stop, the agents 
noticed the odor of marijuana coming from a passenger in the backseat.30  
An immigration agent arrived to interview the men in Spanish and 
determined that the men were in the United States illegally.31  He 
obtained consent from Pineda-Moreno to search both his vehicle and 
home.32  The agents found two garbage bags of marijuana, as well as 
some other, smaller packages of marijuana,33 comprising a total of 
approximately twenty-nine pounds.34 
A grand jury indicted Pineda-Moreno on one count of conspiracy to 
manufacture marijuana and one count of manufacturing marijuana.35  
Pineda-Moreno moved to suppress the evidence collected by the mobile 
tracking devices.36  He argued that the government invaded an area in 
which he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when they 
installed the devices onto the undercarriage of his vehicle, thereby 
violating his Fourth Amendment rights.37  The district court denied his 
motion to suppress, concluding that Pineda-Moreno had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy because the agents installed the devices when his 
vehicle was parked in his open driveway, on the street and in a public 
 28 Id. 
 29 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214. 
 30 Id. at 1214; Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. 
 31 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214; Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. 
 32 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214; Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. 
 33 Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. 
 34 Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-
30385), 2009 WL 4611261. 
 35 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214; see 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vii), 846(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(A)(vii) (Westlaw 2011). 
 36 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214. 
 37 Id. Defendant did not argue that the agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
monitoring his vehicle’s movements with the tracking devices until he appealed the denial of his 
motion to suppress. Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL  4611261. 
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parking lot.38  Pineda-Moreno entered a conditional guilty plea and 
reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.39 
1. Installation of GPS Tracking Devices as an Invasion of Privacy 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Pineda-
Moreno’s motion to suppress.40  It held that the government did not 
violate Pineda-Moreno’s Fourth Amendment rights by affixing mobile 
tracking devices, without a warrant, to the underside of his vehicle when 
it was parked in his driveway, on a public street, and in a parking lot.41  
The court reasoned that Pineda-Moreno did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of his vehicle or in any of the 
areas in which agents attached the devices to his parked vehicle.42  Since 
the court determined that Pineda-Moreno had no legitimate expectation 
of privacy, the government did not conduct a search when they attached 
the devices to his vehicle without a warrant;43 therefore, Pineda-Moreno 
could claim no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.44 
2. Extended Monitoring as a “Search” 
On appeal, Pineda-Moreno argued that the government’s use of the 
devices to monitor the movements of his vehicle over an extended period 
of time constituted an unreasonable search, thereby violating his Fourth 
Amendment rights.45  The Ninth Circuit concluded that this argument did 
 38 Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-
30385), 2009 WL 4611261. 
 39 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214. 
 40 Id. at 1217. 
 41 Id. at 1214-15. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1215. 
 44 Id. This Case Note will not address the issue of the installation of the tracking devices or 
the court’s reasoning behind its finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation; instead, it 
will focus on the court’s determination that extended police monitoring of Pineda-Moreno’s 
movements did not constitute a search and therefore did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 
 45 Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. Since Pineda-Moreno did not raise this specific ground in 
the district court, the government contended that the Ninth Circuit should review the district court’s 
decision only for plain error. Conversely, Pineda-Moreno argued that a de novo standard of review 
should be applied on two bases: first, his motion to suppress was broad enough to cover such a 
challenge; and second, the government broadly addressed the use of the device in its response to his 
motion so that the issue was brought to the court’s attention. The Ninth Circuit did not resolve this 
dispute, concluding that under either standard, the district court committed no error in denying his 
motion to suppress. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010). 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/3
EMMETT (FORMATTED).DOC 5/5/2011  5:03:21 PM 
2011] GPS SURVEILLANCE  305 
 
not present a valid ground for granting his motion to suppress.46  The 
court held that police did not conduct a search by monitoring Pineda-
Moreno’s travels through the use of tracking devices over a four-month 
period, because he did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy in his 
movements on public roads.47  To reach this conclusion, the court 
examined Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the 
circumstances in which a defendant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his or her vehicle’s movements.48 
B.  RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.49 
According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution entitles each person “to know that he will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”50 However, before determining 
whether a search was “reasonable,” and evaluating the ramifications of 
that determination on the admissibility of the evidence produced,51 the 
critical threshold inquiry is whether a search ever occurred.52 
 
1.  Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine 
 
To qualify as a search, and therefore implicate the Fourth 
Amendment and its protections, two conditions must be fulfilled.  First, 
the government must be performing the search; the Fourth Amendment 
 46 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217. 
 47 See id.; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 48 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216-17. 
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 50 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). 
 51 If the evidence is obtained through an illegal (i.e., unreasonable) search or seizure, then the 
remedy is the exclusion of that evidence. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding 
that evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in federal courts); see also 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained through illegal searches and 
seizures is inadmissible in state courts). 
 52 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
745-46 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). 
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does not extend its protections to searches performed by private actors.53  
Second, according to the test articulated in Katz v. United States, the 
government must have conducted the search in an area in which an 
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy.54 
While there is no bright-line rule indicating whether an expectation 
of privacy is one that society will accept as reasonable, whether that 
“expectation relates to information that has been ‘exposed to the public’” 
is significant to the analysis.55  Under the Supreme Court’s public-
exposure doctrine, an individual generally does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her activities that he or she exposes to the 
public.56  Following this doctrine, the Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Knotts,57 the seminal case that influences—if not controls—
cases in which law enforcement uses electronic surveillance to track 
defendants’ locations.58 
2.  United States v. Knotts 
In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that law 
enforcement does not conduct a search by using a beeper 59 to track a 
vehicle because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public 
 53 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
 54 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 55 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (2010) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 56 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding a reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists inside a home); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a fenced-in backyard since it was visible to the public 
from a plane flying overhead); Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-16 (holding an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an object’s movements within a home, since they were not visible to the 
public); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-84 (1983) (holding an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements over public roads); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (holding an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
phone numbers dialed from a private telephone since the numbers were conveyed to the telephone 
company, a third party outside the home); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “what a person knowingly exposes to the public,” but it 
may protect what that person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public.”). 
 57 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (noting movements observed by police were “voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look”). 
 58 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Knotts is controlling on the issue of 
prolonged electronic surveillance of an individual); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th 
Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
671 (2010). 
 59 As defined by the Supreme Court, “a beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery 
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
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thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one place to another.”60  In Knotts, police planted a beeper in a 
container of chemicals before one of Knotts’s co-conspirators purchased 
it.61  Using the beeper, the police followed the car carrying the device 
about 100 miles from the container’s place of purchase to Knotts’s 
cabin.62 Relying on the signal from the beeper, and intermittent visual 
surveillance of the cabin, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search 
the cabin, eventually discovering a drug laboratory inside.63  The Court 
held that police monitoring of the beeper over public roads did not 
constitute a search, because the driver “voluntarily conveyed to anyone 
who wanted to look” the direction of his travels, his destination, and any 
stops he made along the way. 64  In other words, the driver knowingly 
exposed his whereabouts to the public, thereby relinquishing any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his travels and destination.65 
Federal appellate courts have uniformly interpreted Knotts as 
holding that location tracking outside the home is analogous to physical 
surveillance.66  However, the circuits have issued conflicting decisions 
concerning whether this holding extends to prolonged electronic 
surveillance.67  More specifically, the circuits are in disagreement over 
whether Knotts left unanswered the issue of prolonged surveillance or 
mass surveillance.68 
 60 Id. at 281. 
 61 Id. at 278. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 279. 
 64 Id. at 281-82. 
 65 Id. at 282. 
 66 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
 67 Compare Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (deciding that no search took place when law 
enforcement used a GPS to track a drug trafficking operation’s truck) and Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 
at 1216-17 (police did not conduct a search of the defendant's car by warrantless monitoring for of 
its movements over two months through GPS devices) and Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996 (holding no 
search or seizure when police retrieved car's travel history from GPS device placed on car’s 
undercarriage) with United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
671 (2010) (holding prolonged GPS-monitoring of vehicle’s travels constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 68 Compare Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (leaving open the question whether “mass” electronic 
surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, requiring a warrant) and Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (reserving the issue of “mass” electronic surveillance) and Garcia, 474 
F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Knotts Court reserved the issue of “mass” electronic 
surveillance) with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 (noting that the Knotts Court pointedly declined to 
decide the issue of prolonged, twenty-four hour electronic surveillance of an individual). 
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II.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT BASED ITS DECISION ON AN INCORRECT 
 UNDERSTANDING OF KNOTTS 
In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit held that law enforcement’s 
prolonged and warrantless use of GPS tracking devices to monitor the 
defendant’s vehicle’s movements did not constitute a search and 
therefore was not subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.69  The court arrived at this conclusion based on its analysis 
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Knotts v. United States;70 however, 
the court’s analysis failed to account for the limited scope of the Knotts 
holding.  As a result, the Ninth Circuit based its decision in Pineda-
Moreno on the precise issue the Supreme Court declined to decide in 
Knotts: whether prolonged twenty-four-hour electronic surveillance of an 
individual constitutes a search. 
A.  THE PINEDA-MORENO COURT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE LIMITED 
 HOLDING IN KNOTTS 
By analogy, the Ninth Circuit determined that the facts of Pineda-
Moreno fell squarely within the Knotts decision.71  It reasoned that, in 
both cases, technology provided police with a substitute for following the 
defendants’ vehicles on public streets, and “the only information the 
agents obtained from the tracking devices was a log of the locations 
where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled, information the agents could have 
obtained by following the car.”72  Like the beeper in Knotts, the court 
reasoned, the GPS device merely provided police with a more efficient 
form of tracking Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle on public streets.73  Since the 
Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from “augmenting the 
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as 
science and technology afforded them in this case,”74 the court deduced 
that following a car on a public street is not a search.75  Thus, according 
to the Ninth Circuit, the GPS devices attached to the defendant’s vehicle 
merely provided an efficient substitute for police to follow Pineda-
Moreno’s Jeep on public roads—an activity that falls outside the scope 
 69 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217. 
 70 See id. at 1216. 
 71 See id.  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)). 
 75 Id. at 1217 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
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of the Fourth Amendment.76  Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Pineda-Moreno was factually analogous to Knotts, a closer look reveals 
that the Supreme Court actually reserved the exact issue posed in 
Pineda-Moreno. 
1.  The Knotts Court Declined to Analyze the Issue of Prolonged 
 Surveillance 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Knotts holding as conclusive 
authority concerning the issue of prolonged surveillance.77  However, as 
the language of the Knotts opinion established, the Court actually 
declined to analyze whether prolonged surveillance of an individual by 
the government constitutes a search cognizable under the Fourth 
Amendment.78 
In Knotts, the Court reserved the issue of whether a warrant would 
be required in a case that involved twenty-four-hour surveillance.79  The 
Court stated, “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough 
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable.”80  By reserving the issue of “dragnet” practices, the Court 
referred directly to Knotts’s contention that prolonged “twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without 
judicial knowledge or supervision.”81  In other words, the Court 
explicitly rejected Knotts’s concern that its decision would lead to the 
endorsement of warrantless twenty-four-hour tracking of individuals.82  
Thus, contrary to what the Ninth Circuit concluded in Pineda-Moreno, 
 76 Id. at 1216. 
 77 Citing the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Garcia, the Pineda-Moreno court wrote that 
“[s]hould [the] government someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular 
movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted 
to treat such surveillance as a search.” Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 n.2. 
 78 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010); 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology 
and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007); see also United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983). 
 79 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84 (1983). 
 80 Id. at 284. 
  81 Id. at 283 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 9-10, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 
(1983) (No. 81-1802)). The quoted section of the defendant’s brief stated, “we respectfully submit 
that the Court should remain mindful that should it adopt the result maintained by the government, 
twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial 
knowledge or supervision.” 
 82 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558; see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283. 
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the Court did not decide whether prolonged twenty-four-hour monitoring 
constituted a search, thereby limiting its holding to the facts before it.83 
However, the Ninth Circuit did not interpret this passage in the 
Knotts decision to mean that the Court declined to decide the issue of 
prolonged twenty-four-hour surveillance; rather, it reasoned that the 
Court reserved the issue of “mass” electronic surveillance, apparently 
based on the Court’s use of the term “dragnet.”84  Although the Pineda-
Moreno court did not define “mass” electronic surveillance, it referred to 
another circuit’s decision that defined the issue as tracking the 
movements of numerous vehicles.85 
2.  Other Courts Acknowledge That Knotts Did Not Decide the Issue of 
 Prolonged Surveillance  
Since the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pineda-Moreno, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that the Knotts Court pointedly declined to evaluate 
whether prolonged electronic tracking constituted a search.86  In United 
States v. Maynard, the D.C. Circuit resoundingly rejected the notion that 
what the Knotts Court left unanswered was the question “whether 
‘wholesale’ or ‘mass’ electronic surveillance of many individuals 
requires a warrant.”87  While the court did not dispute that a defendant 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements during 
a discrete journey under Knotts, it observed that the Supreme Court 
specifically avoided holding that the Fourth Amendment condoned 
prolonged warrantless location tracking.88  Applying this understanding 
of Knotts to the case before it, the D.C. Circuit held that police violated 
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they monitored a 
GPS device attached to his vehicle around-the-clock for twenty-eight 
 83 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283). 
 84 The Pineda-Moreno court wrote that “[s]hould [the] government someday decide to 
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide 
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.” United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 85 When the Pineda-Moreno court reserved the issue of mass surveillance, it cited the 
Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Garcia. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (9th Cir. 
2010). In Garcia, the court similarly reserved the issue mass government electronic surveillance of 
vehicular movements after envisioning a hypothetical law requiring all new cars to come equipped 
with a GPS device so that the government could track all vehicular movement. United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 86 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010); see also Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217. 
 87 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 88 Id. at 556. 
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days.89  The court concluded that in doing so, law enforcement 
conducted a 90
Likewise, other courts have recognized that the Supreme Court did 
not decide the issue of unlimited and prolonged government electronic 
surveillance of individuals.  In United States v. Butts, the Fifth Circuit 
emphasized the limited police use of a signal device to track the 
defendant, writing “[a]s did the Supreme Court in Knotts, we pretermit 
any ruling on worst-case situations that may involve persistent, extended, 
or unlimited violations of a warrant’s terms.”91 Additionally, the New 
York Court of Appeals pointed out in People v. Weaver that Knotts 
concerned a “single trip” and the Court specifically reserved the issue of 
twenty-four-hour surveillance.92  Therefore, “[a]ccording to the 
[Supreme] Court, its decision [in Knotts] should not be read to sanction 
‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.’”93 
At least two district courts have adopted the Maynard interpretation 
of the Knotts holding.94  Like the D.C. Circuit in Maynard, the Eastern 
District of New York and the Southern District of Texas also noted that 
Knotts is not dispositive on the issue of prolonged tracking.95 Based in 
part on this determination, the courts denied the government’s requests 
for access to several months’ worth of historical cell-site location 
records.96 
Alternatively, circuit precedent (as well as a number of district-court 
decisions),97 supports the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Knotts;98 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 92 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1198-201 (N.Y. 2009). 
 93 Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007). 
 94 See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, NOS. H-10-998M, H-10-
981M, 2010 WL 4286365, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010); see also In re Application of the U.S. for 
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-0897 (JO), 2010 WL 
5437209, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010). 
 95 See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, NOS. H-10-998M, H-10-
981M, 2010 WL 4286365, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010); see also In re Application of the U.S. for 
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-0897 (JO), 2010 WL 
5437209, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010). 
 96 See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, NOS. H-10-998M, H-10-
981M, 2010 WL 4286365, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010); see also In re Application of the U.S. for 
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-0897 (JO), 2010 WL 
5437209, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010). 
 97 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, No. 2:10-cr-32, 2011 WL 651414, at *2 (W.D. Mich. 
Feb. 11, 2011) (concluding that police did not conduct a search by monitoring signals from a GPS 
attached to the defendants car because the defendant “knowingly exposed her vehicle's location to 
the public when she drove on public roads”); United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, 2010 
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however, this precedent is similarly flawed.  Prior to the Pineda-Moreno 
decision, two circuits held that the use of a GPS tracking device to 
monitor an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged 
period was not a search.99  In United States v. Garcia, the Seventh 
Circuit read Knotts to endorse all “tracking of a vehicle on public 
streets.”100  In United States v. Marquez, the Eighth Circuit came to the 
same conclusion in a similar case.101  After holding that the defendant 
had no standing to challenge the use of the GPS device, that court noted 
that, even if he did have standing, no search took place when law 
enforcement used the device to track a drug trafficking operation’s 
truck.102  Like the Ninth Circuit in Pineda-Moreno, both courts identified 
and declined to decide the same issue they mistakenly believed the 
Supreme Court left open in Knotts: whether “mass” electronic 
surveillance required a warrant.103  These courts did not recognize that 
the Supreme Court drew a distinction in Knotts between short-term and 
prolonged surveillance—not the issue of “mass” surveillance of multiple 
individuals.104 
The Ninth Circuit faced the precise issue the Supreme Court 
reserved in Knotts: whether prolonged electronic surveillance by the 
government constitutes a search.105  In Pineda-Moreno, law enforcement 
monitored the defendant’s whereabouts twenty-four hours a day for four 
months.106  Like Maynard and other courts that faced similar issues, the 
WL 4595522, at *6 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010) (holding the monitoring of a GPS device attached to 
undercarriage of defendant’s vehicle did not implicate Fourth Amendment protections); United 
States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010) 
(holding government monitoring of a GPS device placed on defendant’s van did not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1307-08 (N.D. 
Fla. 2010) (holding monitoring of GPS device placed on defendant's vehicle did not violate his 
Fourth Amendment rights since he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s 
movements); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the 
warrantless use of a GPS device to track the defendant's vehicle did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the defendant had no expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s travels on public 
roads). 
 98 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 99 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 100 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010); see Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. 
 101 Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id.; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
 104 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564-65. 
 105 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983); United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 106 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/3
EMMETT (FORMATTED).DOC 5/5/2011  5:03:21 PM 
2011] GPS SURVEILLANCE  313 
ments. 
 
Ninth Circuit should have recognized the limited holding of Knotts.107  
Accordingly, the court should have then proceeded to analyze whether 
Pineda-Moreno had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements over time.108  Instead, by failing to recognize that the facts 
presented in Pineda-Moreno fell outside the scope of the Knotts holding, 
the Ninth Circuit prematurely ended its analysis of Pineda-Moreno’s 
Fourth Amendment claim. 
III.  PROLONGED GPS MONITORING REVEALS AN INTIMATE PICTURE OF 
 THE SUBJECT’S LIFE 
Like the courts in Knotts and Maynard, the Ninth Circuit should 
have “explicitly distinguished between the limited information 
discovered by use of [a] beeper—movements during a discrete journey—
and more comprehensive or sustained monitoring at issue in [Pineda-
Moreno].”109  This analysis involves two issues: the duration of the 
electronic monitoring and the GPS technology that enabled such 
surveillance.  On both of these issues, the facts of Knotts are entirely 
distinguishable from those in Pineda-Moreno.  In fact, the prolonged 
GPS tracking involved in Pineda-Moreno revealed fundamentally 
different information from that collected during the short-term 
surveillance enabled by the beeper used in Knotts.110  However, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed neither of these issues, thereby precluding the 
court from finding that Pineda-Moreno had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the totality of his move
A.  DURATION OF TRACKING 
The Knotts Court emphasized the limited information law 
enforcement collected by following signals that were emitted from the 
beeper placed in the defendant’s vehicle during a single 100-mile trip.111  
In particular, the Court carefully noted the “limited use which the 
 107 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010). 
 108 Id. at 564-65 (concluding that Knotts was not dispositive on the issue of prolonged 
surveillance, the D.C. Circuit proceeded to analyze whether the defendant had an expectation of 
privacy in his movements that society recognized as reasonable). 
 109 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1983)). 
 110 Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (using signals relayed from a beeper placed in a 
container of chemicals placed in the vehicle, police tracked its route for approximately 100 miles 
during one discrete trip) with Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213 (agents tracked Pineda-Moreno’s 
vehicle’s movements over the course of four months using GPS). 
 111 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85. 
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government made of the signals from this particular beeper” and 
explained that “nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was 
received or relied upon after it had indicated that the [container] had 
ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent’s premises.”112  In 
part, these observations led the Court to conclude that police did not 
conduct a search when they followed the driver from one location to 
another just 100 miles away by monitoring signals relayed by the beeper 
attached to the vehicle.113  Thus, the Court emphasized the limited use of 
the beeper by highlighting the fact that law enforcement used it only to 
track the defendant’s travels during one discrete trip.114 
The D.C. Circuit adopted the Supreme Court’s distinction between 
short- and long-term surveillance when analyzing whether electronic 
surveillance constituted a search in United States v. Maynard.115  In its 
analysis, that court highlighted the fact that police tracked the 
defendant’s movements twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight days—
not just during one trip, as was the case in Knotts.116  As a result, that 
court concluded, 
[T]he police used the GPS device not to track [the driver’s] 
“movements from one place to another,” . . . but rather to track [the 
driver’s] movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he moved among 
scores of places, thereby discovering the totality and pattern of his 
movements from place to place to place.117 
Consequently, the Maynard court recognized that the amount and type of 
information revealed by the GPS tracking in the case before it greatly 
exceeded that gathered in Knotts.118  The court reasoned that an isolated 
trip reveals only limited information about the driver; in contrast, 
prolonged surveillance exposes patterns in a driver’s movements from 
which onlookers can easily infer the private activities, interests, and 
relationships of the subject.119  This recognition of the fundamental 
difference between the information gathered in Knotts and that acquired 
in Maynard caused the D.C. Circuit to conclude that law enforcement did 
 112 Id. The Supreme Court also emphasized the fact that law enforcement never monitored the 
signal from the interior of the defendant’s cabin. Id. at 284. 
 113 Id. at 285. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556-58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
671 (2010). 
 116 See id. at 558. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 562. 
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conduct a search.120 
Unlike the Supreme Court in Knotts and the D.C. Circuit in 
Maynard, the Ninth Circuit noted no distinction between short- and long-
term surveillance.121  Not only did law enforcement track Pineda-Moreno 
three months longer than they tracked the defendant in Maynard, they 
tracked him continuously during scores of trips, in contrast to the single 
trip in Knotts.122  Pineda-Moreno contended that surveillance conducted 
“over an extended period of time” significantly affected the “amount, 
quality and nature” of the information revealed.123  The Ninth Circuit 
declined to address this argument in its analysis of whether Pineda-
Moreno had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements.124  In 
addition to arguing that the prolonged duration of law enforcement’s 
surveillance violated his reasonable expectation of privacy, Pineda-
Moreno also argued that the capabilities of GPS tracking technology 
further distinguished the facts of Knotts from his case.125 
B.  GPS TECHNOLOGY VS. BEEPERS 
The Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish between the technology used 
in Knotts—a beeper—and the far more technologically advanced GPS 
tracking devices used in Pineda-Moreno.126  This distinction bears on the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Pineda-Moreno’s Fourth Amendment claim 
because it reveals that GPS tracking is less like visual surveillance, as the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned,127 than the beeper tracking in Knotts.128 
 120 See id. at 565. 
 121 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010). Instead of 
addressing this distinction, the court addressed Pineda-Moreno’s argument that Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), had “heavily modified” analysis under the Fourth Amendment.  In his 
brief, Pineda-Moreno argued that Kyllo modified analysis of advanced technology under the Fourth 
Amendment, including GPS. However, the court pointed out that in Kyllo law enforcement used 
thermal imaging technology to acquire information from within a home—an area traditionally 
accorded a much higher level of protection than a vehicle’s movements in public. Since the areas 
considered in each case require two fundamentally different analyses, the court correctly rejected 
Pineda-Moreno’s argument as a valid basis to grant his claim. 
 122 Compare Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213, 1216, with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 278-79 (1983). 
 123 Reply Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611262. 
 124 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 125 See Reply Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611262. 
 126 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983); see, e.g., State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 
217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (determining that GPS technology “does not merely augment the officers' 
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The Ninth Circuit opined that law enforcement’s use of GPS to 
track Pineda-Moreno’s movements over four months substituted for 
visual surveillance, asserting that such an activity is “unequivocally not a 
search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.129  In doing so, 
the court cited Knotts, in which the Supreme Court similarly compared 
beepers to an efficient form of visual surveillance.130  While the Ninth 
Circuit correctly observed that increased efficiency offered by GPS, or 
even that of the less sophisticated Knotts beeper, does not automatically 
mean that its use constitutes a search,131 it does require a court to 
approach it with greater caution.132  Unlike the beeper in Knotts, the GPS 
tracking technology in Pineda-Moreno was much more than a “modest 
improvement over following a car by means of unaided human 
vision.”133 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning does not fully appreciate the nature of 
the information revealed to law enforcement using GPS.  Unlike beepers 
and visual surveillance, GPS technology enables a form of prolonged 
surveillance “that provides law enforcement with a comprehensive, 
detailed, and lengthy record of someone’s movements.”134  Unless police 
resources were unlimited, creating such an extensive record of one’s 
movements through physical visual surveillance would be impractical if 
not impossible.135  Unencumbered by the constraints of time, money, and 
senses, but rather provides a technological substitute for traditional visual tracking”); United States 
v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that GPS surveillance could be considered 
either a high-tech “substitute for police surveillance” or a “more sophisticated beeper”); Renee 
McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 409, 457 (2007) (recognizing that “beeper and GSP technology are fundamentally different in 
terms of the quantity of information revealed by the science”); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS 
Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of 
the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 696 (2005) (arguing that GPS 
surveillance reveals information that neither visual surveillance nor beeper-attendant surveillance 
could gather). 
 129 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 130 Id. 
 131 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 132 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 661, 696 (2005). 
 133 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
 134 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 661, 696 (2005). 
 135 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010) (“[P]ractical considerations prevent visual surveillance from lasting very long. Continuous 
human surveillance for a week would require all the time and expense of several police officers, 
while comparable photographic surveillance would require a net of video cameras so dense and so 
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manpower, GPS tracking technology enables “a heretofore unknown 
type of intrusion into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.”136 
Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s denial of 
Pineda-Moreno’s petition for rehearing en banc recognized this 
capability of GPS.137  He explained that since a GPS device performs 
tracking on its own and records its location—functions that beepers 
lack—the devices law enforcement used in Pineda-Moreno are 
completely unlike the primitive beepers used in Knotts.138  The fantastic 
capabilities of GPS devices allow them to “record the car’s movements 
without human intervention—quietly, invisibly, with uncanny precision,” 
creating “a permanent electronic record that can be compared, contrasted 
and coordinated to deduce all manner of private information about 
individuals.”139  In this way, the GPS devices compile not only an 
increased amount of information, but also a different type of information 
by revealing personal details gleaned from patterns of movements over a 
period of time.140 
In Pineda-Moreno, as in Maynard, law enforcement used the GPS 
device not to track Pineda-Moreno’s movements from one place to 
another, but to track his movements around-the-clock for an extended 
period of time.141  Consequently, the device continuously gathered 
information as Pineda-Moreno traveled to dozens of places, allowing law 
enforcement to discover the entirety of his movements and patterns as he 
widespread as to catch a person’s every movement, plus the manpower to piece the photographs 
together.”) “Constant and close surveillance” of a suspect, according to the former Chief of the 
LAPD, is “not only more costly than any police department can afford, but in the vast majority of 
cases it is impossible.” Id. at n.* (quoting W.H. Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictograph: 
Threat or Protection? 42 CAL. L. REV. 727, 734 (1954)). 
 136 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565. 
 137 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 138 Id. at 1124. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-65 (“A person who knows all of another’s travels can 
deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful 
husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political 
groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.”); Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 
1125 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“By tracking and recording the 
movements of millions of individuals the government can use computers to detect patterns and 
develop suspicions. It can also learn a great deal about us because where we go says much about 
who we are. Are Winston and Julia's cell phones together near a hotel a bit too often? Was Syme's 
OnStar near an STD clinic? Were Jones, Aaronson and Rutherford at that protest outside the White 
House?”); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 456 (2007) (explaining that GPS enables its user to collect an 
increased quantity of information, which in turn affects the quality of information revealed). 
 141 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214. 
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drove from place to place.142  The GPS devices tracking Pineda-Moreno, 
therefore, did not merely provide a record of his travels on public roads; 
they provided four months worth of detail about his life, creating an 
“intimate picture”143 of his life.144  As Pineda-Moreno explained in his 
brief, GPS technology allowed law enforcement to acquire a type of 
information about Pineda-Moreno that the public could not have 
gathered through visual surveillance.145  While he clearly was not 
“‘imperceptible’ to others” when he was driving, “his exact location, 
over an extended period of time, is information that is imperceptible 
except through the use”146 of the GPS tracking device.147  The 
accumulation of personal habits, travels and details easily inferred from 
Pineda-Moreno’s exact locations over a prolonged time period revealed 
much more information than merely his travels over public roads. 
Like the Supreme Court in Knotts and the D.C. Circuit in Maynard, 
the Ninth Circuit should have distinguished between short- and long-
term surveillance and the technologies that enabled such surveillance.  
After all, the use of GPS tracking technology is “most productive for law 
enforcement, and most troublesome in constitutional terms, when it is 
used over extended spans of time.”148  Law enforcement’s prolonged and 
unrelenting tracking of Pineda-Moreno stands in stark contrast to the 
brief intrusion occasioned by police in Knotts.149  Had the Ninth Circuit 
considered the duration that Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle was under 
 142 See id. at 1216. 
 143 Several courts have recognized that prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture 
of one’s life. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-65 (prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate 
picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have-short perhaps of his spouse.); People v. 
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199-200 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that prolonged GPS monitoring yields “a 
highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations—
political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the patterns of our 
professional and avocational pursuits”); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003) (“In this 
age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places that can reveal preferences, 
alignments associations, personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these 
travels, and thus can provide a detailed picture of one’s life.”); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS 
Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of 
the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 696 (2005) (commenting that 
the capabilities of GPS tracking technology creates a “lengthy, detailed record of one’s location 
[that] provides a comprehensive picture of one’s life”). 
 144 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 145 Reply Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611262. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. 
 148 Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 463 (2007). 
 149 Compare United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213-14, 16 (9th Cir. 2010) 
with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
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surveillance, and the technology used to track it, the court would have 
found that he did not expose the “totality of his movements” to the public 
over the course of four months.  Thus, in tracking Pineda-Moreno’s 
movements for four months, law enforcement’s conduct violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted a search. 
IV.  PINEDA-MORENO HAD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
 IN THE TOTALITY OF HIS MOVEMENTS 
Since law enforcement’s use of GPS tracking devices in Pineda-
Moreno amounted to a search, the reasonableness test set out in Katz 
applies.150  Application of the Katz test and its progeny to the facts of 
Pineda-Moreno leads to one conclusion: society recognized as 
reasonable Pineda-Moreno’s expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s 
movements over the course of four months.  Further, law enforcement 
violated his reasonable expectation of privacy when it used GPS tracking 
technology to monitor his travels continuously for four months. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision that Pineda-Moreno had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the totality of his movement centered largely on 
the court’s application of the public-exposure doctrine to the facts of this 
case.151  The court determined that Pineda-Moreno exposed his travels to 
the public by driving on public roads, thereby diminishing his 
expectation of privacy.152  Indeed, it is a well-established principle that 
“[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle” because “a car 
has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.”153  After all, it is 
unreasonable for law enforcement to avert their eyes from what an 
individual exposes to the rest of the public.154  However, when 
considering GPS technology, the argument that an individual has no 
expectation of privacy in his or her travels on public roads whatsoever 
“misses the point.”155  Prolonged GPS monitoring does not merely 
provide a record of an individual’s movement on public roads; rather, it 
 150 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 151 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); see also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82; Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1978). 
 154 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking 
Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public 
Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 696 (2005). 
 155 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 661, 698 (2005). 
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reveals an intimate picture of that person’s life.156  It is in these personal 
details accumulated throughout the totality of his or her movements that 
a person reasonably expects privacy.157 
An inquiry into what a person “exposes to the public” involves 
asking what a reasonable person might do, rather than what would be 
reasonably and legally possible for a person to do.158 The Supreme Court 
has affirmed this approach in multiple cases.159  For example, in Bond v. 
United States, the Court held that a Border Patrol agent violated a bus 
passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights when he physically manipulated 
the passenger’s bag.160  The Court explained that a bus passenger 
undoubtedly expects that others may handle his bag, but he does not 
expect others to feel his bag in an “exploratory manner.”161  This 
explanation encapsulated the idea that a court should focus on what a 
reasonable person expects others might actually do, instead of what 
others might theoretically do. 
According to the D.C. Circuit, it is unreasonable for a person to 
expect anyone to track and record for a prolonged period the collective 
whole of his or her vehicle’s movements, much less each stop and the 
 156 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563-65 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
671 (2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: 
The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 698 (2005); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in 
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 419 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007) (“In the 
case of GPS-enabled tracking, it is this aggregation of substantial amounts of personal data that 
makes the limitless use of the technology constitutionally troublesome.”). 
 157 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563-65 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
671 (2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: 
The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 698 (2005); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in 
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 419 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007) (“In the 
case of GPS-enabled tracking, it is this aggregation of substantial amounts of personal data that 
makes the limitless use of the technology constitutionally troublesome.”). 
 158 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559. 
 159 See, e.g., id.; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (“Here, the inspection was made 
from a helicopter, but as is the case with fixed-wing planes, ‘private and commercial flight [by 
helicopter] in the public airways is routine’ in this country, and there is no indication that such 
flights are unheard of in Pasco County, Florida.” (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215)); Greenwood, 
486 U.S. at 40 (“It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public 
street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public.”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214-15 (1986) (holding defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in location that “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace 
who glanced down could have seen everything these officers observed”). 
 160 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000). 
 161 Id. 
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corresponding inferences.162  Instead, a person expects each of his or her 
movements “to remain disconnected and anonymous.”163  When the 
Supreme Court wrote in Knotts that the vehicle driver exposed his 
movements to “anyone who wanted to look,”164 it merely summarized 
the notion “that one in public normally experiences a series of fleeting 
glances by a variety of individuals over time.”165  Therefore, the inquiry 
whether someone exposes his or her actions or location to the public 
should not depend on theoretical probabilities; instead, it should center 
around the “actual likelihood of discovery by a stranger.”166  Applying 
this analytical framework to Pineda-Moreno reveals that while he was 
subject to fleeting glances from various individuals, he did not expose 
the totality of his movements to the public. 
Indeed, Pineda-Moreno exposed each of his movements to others by 
driving on public roads.  After all, by going outside, Pineda-Moreno was 
not imperceptible to others.  However, in actuality, he did not expose the 
totality of his movements over the course of four months to the public 
because “the likelihood that a stranger would observe all those 
movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.”167  Like physical 
manipulation of the carry-on bag in Bond, the extended and surreptitious 
recordation of Pineda-Moreno’s movements was not what he reasonably 
expected anyone to do.168  The combination of GPS tracking capabilities 
coupled with prolonged monitoring prevented his movements from 
remaining “disconnected and anonymous.”169  Consequently, it was not 
 162 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 
(2010). 
 163 Id. (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., 
concurring)). 
 164 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 165 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 661, 696 (2005). 
 166 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560. 
 167 Id.; see also Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the 
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 453 (2007) (“While individuals understand that portions 
of their route may be observed by others, it is unlikely that most people contemplate a 
comprehensive mapping of their whereabouts over a span of weeks or even months, including the 
location of each stop and the duration of every trip segment.”); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New 
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. 
REV. 507, 547-48 (2005) (advocating a “limited third party” approach to Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, noting that a driver “conveys his or her position to pedestrians and other drivers to avoid an 
accident. [However,] most drivers would not think they were conveying their entire driving route to 
bystanders.”). 
 168 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United 
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010). 
 169 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 
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reasonable for Pineda-Moreno to expect every single movement to be 
secretly and continuously recorded for four months.170  Pineda-Moreno 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of his movements 
over four months.  Thus, the actions of law enforcement in continuously 
monitoring his location were subject to the reasonableness requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
V.  A PROPOSED ANALYSIS THAT ACCOUNTS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL’S 
 PRIVACY INTERESTS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s public-
exposure doctrine, particularly the analysis of that doctrine in United 
States v. Knotts, undermined its opinion in Pineda-Moreno.  Specifically, 
the Pineda-Moreno court did not account for the privacy interest at stake 
when the government utilizes advanced technology, like GPS tracking, to 
conduct comprehensive surveillance of an individual.  This Note 
proposes an approach to this issue that preserves the privacy guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment while comporting with the public-exposure 
doctrine, regardless of what new technologies law enforcement utilizes.  
This analysis involves two steps: first, the court should recognize the 
inherent limitations of the Knotts holding; second, when determining 
whether an individual had a justifiable expectation of privacy in his or 
her movements, the court should evaluate law enforcement’s activity in 
light of what a reasonable person would expect others might actually do. 
 Refining an analysis of the public-exposure doctrine in Knotts 
requires that courts recognize the limitations of that holding.  In doing so, 
courts will be able to determine the validity of a Fourth Amendment 
claim without prematurely ending the analysis.  The Supreme Court has 
not addressed the monitoring of GPS signals under the Fourth 
Amendment;171 therefore, Knotts is not controlling on the issue.172  
(N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)). 
 170 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; see also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; April A. 
Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the 
Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 
696 (2005). 
 171 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 661, 674 (2005); see Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The Government Knows Where 
You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 103, 107 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has made no decision regarding GPS 
technology). 
 172 See Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 453 (2007) (concluding that the constitutionality of GPS 
surveillance is not governed by Knotts for two reasons: first, the Knotts Court limited its decision to 
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Because of its limited scope, the Knotts holding only provides guidance 
in the approach courts should take to their application of the public-
exposure doctrine. 
An individual does not relinquish all of his or her privacy merely by 
stepping outside.173 The Court’s decision in Knotts reflects this principle 
because it merely held that a driver has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another;174 it did not hold 
that he or she has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
whatsoever.175  After all, protecting people—not places—is the aim of 
the Fourth Amendment.176  Thus, a refined analysis of an individual’s 
privacy interest under the public-exposure doctrine should recognize that 
an individual who moves about in public does not knowingly expose to 
others (including law enforcement) the whole of his or her movements 
and the information that can be inferred from such movements.177  
Instead, by “walking or driving in public,” a person only “knowingly 
exposes to others bits and pieces of his movements and activities.”178 
Evaluating the extent of law enforcement’s intrusion during its 
surveillance helps determine whether an individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Furthermore, examining the quantity and type of 
information uncovered by the technology is significant to this analysis. 
In the case of Pineda-Moreno, this would have involved the 
consideration of the duration of the electronic surveillance and the 
technology that enabled it.  With an eye toward an individual’s practical 
expectations of what others might do, considering the accessibility of the 
technology, the extent of its use and the degree of resulting intrusion, a 
court can decide a Fourth Amendment case on its own facts, and “not by 
extravagant generalizations”179 about the technology used.  In this way, a 
court will thoroughly analyze an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy and objectively determine whether he or she exposed his or her 
resolve only the question of the permissible use of beepers, thereby avoiding the issue of twenty-
four-hour surveillance of individuals; second, and most importantly, “beeper and GPS technology 
are fundamentally different in terms of the quantity of information revealed by the science”). 
 173 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[W]hat 
[one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”). 
 174 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1983). 
 175 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 176 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (holding that application of the Fourth Amendment does not 
require trespass over physical boundaries). 
 177 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 661, 674 (2005). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986). 
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movements to the public.  The result of this analysis ensures that courts 
will adhere to the public-exposure doctrine while protecting individuals’ 
privacy in the Information Age. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that law enforcement’s 
utilization of more advanced forms of technology threatens to diminish 
the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 180 To avoid this, 
courts should “take the long view, from the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment forward,”181 so as to protect the rights and privacy 
interests of the public.182  While courts cannot read the Fourth 
Amendment as confining law enforcement to the technology and tactics 
available in the eighteenth century,183 privacy concerns raised by 
fantastic technological advances oblige the Supreme Court to watch 
closely to safeguard fairness in the federal court system.184 Federal 
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, share that burden with the Supreme 
Court when they face Fourth Amendment claims involving advanced 
technologies. 
CONCLUSION 
Pineda-Moreno highlights the convergence between Fourth 
Amendment protections and advanced technology that enables law 
enforcement to easily access individuals’ personal information.  In its 
analysis of this complex legal intersection, the Ninth Circuit was not 
sufficiently alert to the issue the Supreme Court reserved in Knotts: 
whether prolonged twenty-four-hour electronic surveillance of an 
individual constitutes a search.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit based its 
decision on the assumption that the Supreme Court had decided that 
issue.185  As a result, the court prematurely rejected Pineda-Moreno’s 
Fourth Amendment claim without analyzing whether he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the collective pattern of his movements over a 
four-month period.  Close consideration of both the duration of the 
electronic monitoring and the GPS technology that enabled the 
surveillance would have revealed that law enforcement obtained 
information of a type that was not available to the public through simple 
(or even technologically enhanced) visual surveillance.  Thus, law 
enforcement’s use of GPS technology to monitor Pineda-Moreno’s 
 180 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 181 Id. at 40. 
 182 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
 183 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 184 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
 185 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010). 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/3
EMMETT (FORMATTED).DOC 5/5/2011  5:03:21 PM 
2011] GPS SURVEILLANCE  325 
 
movements over the course of four months constituted a search because 
it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Pineda-Moreno presents an argument for the placement of 
constitutional limitations on GPS tracking.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that “the Constitution requires the sacrifice of neither security 
nor liberty.”186  In other words, society should not have to surrender 
personal privacy at the feet of technology’s progress.  Instead, 
technological advancements should increase the judiciary’s appreciation 
for the role of personal privacy in society, so as to spark its desire to 
manage it.  After all, the GPS devices in Pineda-Moreno’s case “are just 




 186 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). 
 187 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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